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Abstract

By October 2008, Portuguese banks’ access to liquidity was severely restricted due to strains
in international wholesale markets. On October 12-13, 2008, the Portuguese government
notified the European Commission of a guarantee scheme intended to promote solvent credit
institutions’ access to liquidity as part of the European policy response to the acute financial
crisis aiming to achieve and maintain financial stability. Under the scheme, the Portuguese
government guaranteed financing agreements and banks’ issuance of non-subordinated
short- and medium-term debt. To obtain a guarantee under the Scheme, banks paid a fee
based on the maturity of the debt and a risk proxy for the issuer. Banks that called on a
guarantee were required to either pay back the Portuguese state or exchange the loan for
preference shares. Eight credit institutions participated in the Scheme, including three of the
largest Portuguese banks. Collectively they issued approximately €21.5 billion in guaranteed
debt. Initially set to close on December 31, 2009, the Scheme’s issuance window was
repeatedly extended until February 9, 2019. The most recent issuance under the Scheme was
made in early 2013. The last remaining bond guaranteed under the Scheme matured on
February 17, 2017. The Scheme is considered to have been successful in promoting debt
issuance and increasing liquidity in the Portuguese financial system.
Keywords: Portugal, financial crisis, guarantee scheme, state aid, liquidity, interbank credit

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee
programs.
1
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Portuguese Guarantee Scheme
At a Glance
By October 2008, Portuguese banks’ access to
liquidity was severely restricted due to strains
in international wholesale markets. On
October 12-13, 2008, the Portuguese
government notified the European
Commission (EC) of a guarantee scheme (“the
Scheme”) intended to promote solvent credit
institutions’ access to liquidity as part of the
European policy response to the acute
financial crisis aiming to achieve and maintain
financial stability. The Scheme was part of the
Portuguese government’s Initiative to
Strengthen Financial Stability (IREF) which
also included a recapitalization scheme, an
increase in the bank deposit guarantee, and
measures to promote bank transparency.
Under the Scheme, the government would
guarantee financing agreements and banks’
issuance of non-subordinated short- and
medium-term debt. To participate, banks
were required to be solvent and incorporated
in Portugal. The announced budget was €20
billion. To obtain a guarantee, banks had to
pay a fee based on the maturity of the debt
and a risk proxy for the issuer. Banks that
called on a guarantee were required to either
pay back the state or exchange the loan for
preference shares.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To promote the liquidity of solvent credit
institutions in Portugal as part of the European policy
response to the acute financial crisis aiming to
achieve and maintain financial stability.
Announcement
Date

October 12, 2008

Operational Date

October 29, 2008

Date of First
Guaranteed Loan
Issuance

November 24, 2008

Issuance Window
Expiration Date

Initially set at December 31,
2009, but repeatedly extended
to February 9, 2019

Program Size

€20 billion initially, but later
increased to €35 billion in 2011

Usage

Approx. €21.5 billion in
guaranteed issuances by eight
institutions, including three of
the largest Portuguese banks

Outcomes

No defaults. Approximately
€700 million in fees between
2008 and the end of 2015

Notable Features

Required repayment by bank in
the event of default could
initially be exchanged for
preference shares

Eight credit institutions participated in the Scheme, including three of the largest Portuguese banks.
Collectively they issued approximately €21.5 billion in guaranteed debt. Initially set to close on
December 31, 2009, the Scheme’s issuance window was repeatedly extended until February 9,
2019.
Summary Evaluation
The Scheme is considered to have been successful in promoting debt issuance and increasing
liquidity in the Portuguese financial system.
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Portuguese Guarantee Scheme: Portugal Context
$240.6 billion in 2007

GDP

$263.6 billion in 2008

(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

Source: Bloomberg
$22,782 in 2007

GDP per capita

$24,848 in 2008

(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

Source: Bloomberg
As of fourth quarter, 2007:
Fitch: AA
Moody’s: Aa2
S&P: AA-

Sovereign credit
rating

As of fourth quarter, 2008:

(5-year senior debt)

Fitch: AA
Moody’s: Aa2
S&P: AA-

Source: Bloomberg
$336.4 billion in total assets in 2007
Size of banking
system

$401.7 billion in total assets in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
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139.8% in 2007

Size of banking
system as a
percentage of GDP

152.4% in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
Size of banking
system as a
percentage of
financial system

Data not available for 2007/2008

88.2% of total banking assets in 2007
5-bank concentration
of banking system

89.4% of total banking assets in 2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
24% of total banking assets in 2007
Foreign involvement
in banking system

24% of total banking assets in 2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
Data not available for 2007
Government
ownership of banking
system

21% of banks owned by the state in 2008

Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership: Trends and
Implications”
Up to $28,409 in 2003

Existence of deposit
insurance

Up to $133,333 in 2010

Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset
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I. Overview
Background
Portuguese banks were heavily reliant on wholesale funding in the lead-up to the global
financial crisis (IMF 2008). As international wholesale markets became increasingly
strained, credit standards rose, and Portuguese banks faced mounting challenges in
accessing funding (IMF 2008). As was occurring across Europe, credit default swap (CDS)
spreads for Portuguese banks rose (IMF 2008). Smaller, domestically oriented banks were
particularly affected (IMF 2008). By October 2008, access to liquidity was severely
restricted, even for healthy banks.
As noted, similar dynamics were playing out in many European countries. In October 2008,
Eurozone leaders convened for the first-ever Eurozone summit. Portugal, the other 14
countries in the European Monetary Union, and Great Britain attended. On October 12, the
Eurozone summit released a declaration requiring all participating nations to adopt several
key strategies:
•
•
•
•
•

Ensure adequate liquidity
Facilitate ease of funding
Recapitalize deserving banks and provide them with additional capital resources
Be flexible in applying accounting rules
Increase cooperation among participating countries (Summit Declaration
10/12/2008)

Program Description
To promote solvent credit institutions’ access to liquidity consistent with the requirements
of the coordinated action plan agreed on by Eurozone states, on October 12-13, 2008, the
Portuguese government notified the European Commission (EC) of a guarantee scheme (“the
Scheme”) (EC 12/17/2008). Titled Concessão extraordinária de garantias pessoais pelo
Estado, para o reforço da estabilidade financeira e da disponibilização de liquidez nos
mercados financeiros,3 the Scheme was approved by the EC on October 29, 2008, with an
issuance window ending December 31, 2009 (EC 12/17/2008).
The EC authorized the Scheme to “remedy a serious disturbance” under Article 107(3)(b) of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). A new Portuguese legal regime
was also needed to launch the Scheme. On October 20, 2008, a new law⎯Lei n° 60A/2008⎯was passed creating the legal regime for exceptional granting of guarantees.

“Extraordinary granting of personal guarantees by the State, to strengthen financial stability and the
availability of liquidity in the financial markets”
3
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Implementing provisions were laid out in a decree order, Portaria n° 1219-A/2008 of
10/23/2008; subsequent decree orders were issued in 2010, 2012, and 2014. 4
The Scheme formed part of the Portuguese government’s Initiative to Strengthen Financial
Stability5 (IREF).6 The goal of the Scheme was to support financial stability and the
availability of liquidity in Portuguese financial markets.
Under the Scheme, the Portuguese government would guarantee financing agreements and
the issuance of non-subordinated short- and medium-term debt. In order to be eligible,
banks were required to be solvent and incorporated in Portugal. The announced budget was
€20 billion, and around 51-100 credit institutions were eligible to participate (EC
12/17/2008). To obtain a guarantee under the Scheme, banks had to pay a fee based on the
maturity of the debt and a risk proxy for the issuer. Banks that called on a guarantee were
required to either pay back the Portuguese state or exchange the loan for preference shares.
Portugal financed the Scheme by issuing public debt securities (EC 12/17/2008).
Beneficiaries’ aggregate balance sheet growth was monitored and limited. Under certain
circumstances, beneficiaries of the Scheme were required to submit restructuring plans.
The Scheme initially covered only unsubordinated, euro-denominated debt with maturity
between three months and five years. Portugal later expanded the Scheme to include covered
bonds with a maturity of up to seven years.
Outcomes
Eight Portuguese credit institutions participated in the Scheme over the course of its
operation, issuing approximately €21.5 billion in guaranteed debt.7
Three of the largest Portuguese credit institutions—Caixa Geral de Depósitos S.A. (Caixa);
Banco Espírito Santo S.A. (BES); and Millennium/Banco Comercial Português S.A. (BCP)—
issued debt instruments within the Scheme’s first six weeks of operation, each in an amount
over €1 billion (EC 2/22/2010).8

See Portaria nº 946/2010 of 9/22/2010; Portaria nº 80/2012 of 3/27/2012; law 82-B/2014 of
12/31/2014; and article 100 of law 7-A/2016 of 3/30/2016.
5 “Iniciativa de Reforço para a Estabilidade Financeira.”
6 IREF included a recapitalization scheme approved by Law n.º 63-A/2008, of November 24
(https://dre.pt/application/conteudo/444391), notified to the EC on November 5, 2008, and approved by the
EC on May 20, 2009, under State Aid N 556/2008. With the exception of one state-owned bank, Portuguese
credit institutions did not participate in the Portuguese recapitalization scheme during the global financial
crisis (before 2011), though they did draw on this capital line during the sovereign debt crisis (APB 2015; see
also GlobalCapital 2010). IREF also included an increase in the bank deposit guarantee, measures promoting
bank transparency, and a “law aim[ing] to create conditions for credit institutions to strengthen ownership
equity” (Torres 2009).
7 Caixa Geral de Depósitos S.A. (Caixa); Millennium – Banco Comercial Português S.A.; Banco International do
Funchal S.A. (BANIF); Banco Banif Mais, S.A.; Banif – Banco de Investimento, S.A; Banco Espírito Santo S.A.
(BES); Banco Invest S.A.; and Banco Finantia S.A.
8 Of the five largest Portuguese banks, only two—BPI and Santander Totta—did not participate in the Scheme
in its first 18 months of operation (Macedo Vitorino 2010). Both Santander and BPI issued press releases on
4
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The first guaranteed bond issuance under the Scheme was made on November 24, 2008, by
state-owned Caixa Geral de Depósitos, S.A. (Caixa 2009). The bank reported that “[t]he issue
totaled €1.25 billion, or 25% above the initially established amount of €1 billion (the state’s
guarantee permitted an issue of between EUR 1 and 2 billion). The increase was based on
the huge demand which was much higher than the available offer. The bonds, with a maturity
of three years, have a coupon rate of 3.875% (85 [basis points] over the mid swaps level)”
(Caixa 2009; Caixa 12/5/2008).
Caixa’s first issuance was delayed by prolonged negotiations with the Portuguese Treasury
department and hampered by extensive price calculations. The bank reported that “Portugal
was the first non-triple-A jurisdiction to launch government-guaranteed debt and therefore
the pricing discovery was very difficult; it was probably one of the most difficult deals that
we have done” (Global Capital 2010).
Guaranteed issuances by other banks followed in December 2008, January 2009, and April
2009. Then, no debt was issued under the Scheme until mid-2011 (EC 2/22/2010).
The first several months of the Scheme saw the suspension of issuances of senior debt
without a state guarantee; not until February 2009 did a Portuguese bank launch a nongovernment-guaranteed bond issue (Caixa 2009). Caixa, the issuer, noted that “[t]he crisis of
confidence which has been dominating the markets has led investors to concentrate almost
all of their investments in guaranteed debt instruments […]” (Caixa 2009).
As market conditions improved over the course of 2009, bond maturities lengthened and
banks drew less on the Scheme, instead turning to non-guaranteed issuances, and later,
covered bonds (GlobalCapital 2010).
Initially set to close on December 31, 2009, the Scheme’s issuance window was repeatedly
extended until February 9, 2019 (EC 2018). Consistent with European Commission
guidelines for guarantee programs that would remain open beyond June 30, 2010, premiums
for the Scheme increased in 2010 and certain participating banks were required to submit
viability reports.
The last issuance under the Scheme was made in early 2013 (EC 2018). As of August 2018,
there had been no further issuances, and no guarantees were outstanding (EC 2018).
According to the Portuguese Banking Association (APB) 9, between 2008 and 2014, “public
support to the financial system yielded significant revenues” to Portugal, and guarantee fees
made up a significant portion of those revenues (APB 2016). Credit institutions paid the
Portuguese state approximately €700 million in guarantee fees between the start of the
program and the end of 2015 (APB 2015, 2016). According to projections made in 2015 by
October 24, 2008, announcing that they might make issuances under the Scheme. BPI noted in its 2008
results a “potential issue guaranteed by the Portuguese State (1.7 th.M.€),” reporting that “the Bank may, if it
so wishes, resort to the debt issue guaranteed by the Portuguese State up to an amount of 1 700 M.€” (BPI
2009).
9 Associação Portuguesa de Bancos
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the Portuguese Association of Banks (APB), Portuguese banks would pay a total of €807.4
million in fees between 2008 and 2017.
Sovereign credit default swap (CDS) premia affected swap spreads and issuers’ total costs
(Levy and Schich 2010). Generally speaking, Panetta et al. find that “the largest component
of the spread reflects the characteristics of the guarantor, and not those of the issuer”
(Panetta et al. 2009). Along with Spain and Ireland, Portugal had among the highest spreads
at launch between October 2008 and May 2009 (Panetta et al. 2009).
Citing Levy and Zaghini (2010), Levy and Schich (2010) point to “the disconnect between the
issuing bank’s creditworthiness and the cost of issuing guaranteed bonds,” noting that
“Portuguese banks—Banco Commercial Português, Banco Espírito Santo (both rated A) and
Caixa Geral de Depósitos (rated A+)—paid much larger spreads at launch (90–100 basis
points over the swap rate) than German banks such as Commerzbank (rated A), Bayerische
Landesbank and HSH Nordbank AG (both rated BBB+), which paid less than 20 basis points”
over the period from October 2008 to May 2009. Similarly, the guaranteed bonds issued by
the German banks were higher rated (AAA) than the guaranteed bonds issued by the
Portuguese banks (AA) (Levy and Schich 2010).
According to a Bank for International Settlements (BIS) report, “the value of guarantees
seems to have diminished for the weaker euro area countries” between the end of 2009 and
2011, due to increased sovereign risk (BIS 2011).
In December 2013, Moody’s changed the outlook for four banks’ Ba3 Portuguese
government-guaranteed debt ratings from negative to stable in light of the corresponding
change in outlook on the Ba3 Portuguese sovereign bond rating, noting that “Moody’s rates
Portuguese government-guaranteed debt at the sovereign rating level” (Moody’s 2013).
Debt instruments that were guaranteed by Portugal were accepted as collateral for ECB
funding, which was a significant source of liquidity for Portuguese banks over the course of
both the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis (Millennium 2017).
2009 and 2010 saw a significant increase in the proportion of government-guaranteed and
covered bonds across the euro area and among Portuguese banks in particular (BIS 2011).
Much like their Greek and Irish counterparts, Portuguese banks turned to “safer” bonds to
meet their need for Eurosystem-eligible collateral (BIS 2011). In mid-2011, Portuguese
banks “increased their use of Eurosystem liquidity and made greater use of domestic
government bonds or government-guaranteed bank bonds to collateralise this funding” (BIS
2011). Following the May announcement of the IMF-EU support package for Portugal, the
Financial Times reported that “€35 billion worth of [Portuguese]-government guaranteed
bank bonds is probably heading straight for the European Central Bank’s repo facilities” (FT
5/9/2011).10

Caixa, for example, reported that its July and December 2011 issuances, “fully repurchased by Caixa, were
used to collateralise European Central Bank liquidity injection operations” (Caixa 2016). Portugal emphasized
in its 2013 accounting that in general, debt issued under the Scheme was being kept in the issuers’ portfolios:
10
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In July 2011, in the wake of Portugal’s downgrade by Moody’s to “junk,” the ECB announced
that it would cease to apply the Eurosystem’s minimum credit rating threshold in assessing
the eligibility of Portuguese government-guaranteed debt instruments as collateral for
Eurosystem credit operations (Trichet, Reuters 7/7/2011).11 The ECB waiver was
withdrawn upon Portugal’s exit from the EU/IMF program in June 2014 (Bindseil et al.
2017).12 Analysts identified the waiver as key to ensuring that Portuguese banks had
sufficient eligible collateral to obtain ECB funding, noting before the waiver’s announcement
that “[w]ith this measure the ECB probably will substantially reduce the risk of a shortage of
eligible collateral of Portuguese banks to get liquidity from the ECB” (FT 5/9/2011, citing
Citi 2011).
Van Rixtel and Gasperini (2013) emphasize that in Portugal and other “peripheral countries,”
issuers retained debt including government-guaranteed bonds for use as ECB collateral.
They note that “[i]n the first half of 2012, significantly larger shares of gross bond issuance
by Italian, Portuguese and Spanish banks were ‘retained’, i.e. kept by the issuer to be used as
collateral in financial transactions, rather than sold to investors” (van Rixtel and Gasperini
2013). As of March 1, 2015, however, Portuguese banks were no longer allowed to use as
Eurosystem collateral uncovered government-guaranteed bonds that they or a closely linked
entity had issued (EC 3/22/2013). This followed the ECB’s July 2012 decision to freeze at
then-current levels “own-use” of government-guaranteed bonds, with any increases
requiring prior approval (ECB 7/20/2012, announcing ECB 7/3/2012).
Reporting requirements for the Scheme also changed over time. Beginning in late 2011, in
accordance with Article 14, paragraph 3 of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for
budgetary frameworks of the Member States13, Portugal was required as an EU member state
to “publish relevant information on contingent liabilities with potentially large impacts on
public budgets, including government guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities
stemming from the operation of public corporations, including the extent thereof” (EU
Council 2011).

“De notar que estas emissões de dívida garantida pelo Estado foram, na sua generalidade, retidas em carteira
pelos bancos emitentes e utilizadas como colateral em operações de financiamento junto do BCE” (Portugal
1/16/2015).
11 See Article 3: Continued eligibility as collateral of marketable debt instruments guaranteed by the
Portuguese Government, of the Decision of the ECB of 7 July 2011 on temporary measures relating to the
eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Portuguese Government (ECB/2011/10)
(2011/410/EU). The ECB had previously waived collateral requirements for debt instruments issued or
guaranteed by Greece (May 2010) and Ireland (May 2011). It did the same for Cyprus in 2013 (Bindseil et al.
2017).
12 See Decision of the ECB of 20 March 2013 (ECB/2013/5).
13 This directive formed part of the European Parliament and Council’s November 2011 Enhanced Economic
Governance package.
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II. Key Design Decisions
1. The Scheme was part of a larger Portuguese rescue package including a
recapitalization scheme and an increase in deposit insurance.
The Scheme formed part of the Portuguese government’s Initiative to Strengthen Financial
Stability (IREF). IREF included a recapitalization scheme, notified to the EC on November 5,
2008 and approved by the EC on May 20, 2009, under State Aid N 556/2008. With the
exception of one state-owned bank, Portuguese credit institutions did not participate in the
Portuguese recapitalization scheme during the global financial crisis, though they did draw
on this line during the sovereign debt crisis (APB 2015; see also GlobalCapital 2010).
IREF also included an increase in the Portuguese bank deposit guarantee; measures
promoting bank transparency; and a “law aim[ing] to create conditions for credit institutions
to strengthen ownership equity” (Torres 2009).
2. Lei n° 60-A/2008 provided the new legal regime for the Scheme.
A new Portuguese legal regime was needed to launch the Scheme. On October 20, 2008, a
new law⎯Lei n° 60-A/2008⎯was passed creating a new legal regime for exceptional
granting of guarantees. Implementing provisions were laid out in a decree order, Portaria n°
1219-A/2008 of 10/23/2008; subsequent decree orders were issued in 2010, 2012, and
2014.
3. The European Commission approval was required for the Scheme.
Portugal notified the EC of the Scheme on October 15, 2008. On October 29, 2008, the EC
approved the Scheme until December 31, 2009. This meant that guarantees could be granted
until the end of December 2009.
The Scheme was finalized in conjunction with the EC; there were “intensive exchanges”
between the EC and Portuguese authorities before the EC approved the Scheme as “an
appropriate tool for boosting investor confidence without creating undue market
distortions” (EC 10/30/2008).14 As discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the
Guarantee Scheme in such a way as to ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design
of certain program features.
4. The budget of the Scheme started at €20 billion but was increased to €35 billion in
2011.

The EC approval process for Portugal was more drawn out than the process for Sweden (approved on
October 30th), which took three days. On October 13, 2008, upon publication of the 2008 State Aid
Communication, the EC announced that it would “aim to approve schemes that comply with this guidance
very quickly (within 24 hours, if possible),” adding that “[s]upport schemes such as guarantees or
recapitalisation schemes can be cleared by the Commission very quickly if they fulfil conditions which
guarantee that they are well-targeted and proportionate to the objective of stabilising financial markets and
contain certain safeguards against unnecessary negative effects on competition” (EC 10/13/2008).
14
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The budget for the Scheme was initially set at €20 billion. The annual budget for the Scheme
was “set so as to ensure that the overall issuance of guaranteed debt remains stable from
year to year” (EC 12/19/2013).
In 2011, the budget for the scheme was increased to €35 billion as Portugal received a joint
IMF-EU rescue package that totaled €78 billion over three years. The package was “designed
to allow Portugal some breathing space from borrowing in the markets” (IMF 2011). In May
2011, as part of this support plan, the Portuguese authorities increased the total budget for
the Scheme from €20 billion to €35 billion, noting that the government-guaranteed bonds
could “be used by banks for ECB refinancing purposes subject to the approval of the
Governing Council” (IMF 2011). The Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic
Policy Conditionality between Portugal, the EC, the ECB, and the IMF, provided that,
“[s]ubject to approval under EU competition rules, the authorities are committed to facilitate
the issuance of government guaranteed bank bonds for an amount of up to €35 billion,
including the existing package of support measures” (Portugal 5/17/2011).
Portugal financed the Scheme by issuing public debt securities (EC 12/17/2008). This is
particularly significant in light of Portugal’s rising public debt. At the beginning of 2008,
Portugal’s public debt stood at €115.6 billion (68.3% of GDP); by the end of the year, public
debt had risen to €123.1 billion, or 71.6% of GDP (DBRS 2011). APB found that overall, the
“impact of [Portuguese] State aid to the financial system was similar to that in the euro area
and represented 18% of the increase in public debt between 2008 and 2014” (APB 2016).
In turn, according to the Portuguese Association of Banks, “the public debt crisis [led] to the
increase in the usage of guarantees from the State” between 2011 and 2015 (ABP 2015).
In addition to the Scheme’s impact on public debt, DBRS cited guarantees provided under
the Scheme (€4.9 billion, or 2.8% of GDP, at June 2011) among the factors having contributed
to “a sharp increase in contingent liabilities” (DBRS 2011).
Portugal reported to the EC that “the net cash balance at the moment of the scheme’s windup, whether due to being unused or resulting from reimbursements of credit institutions as
well as from the guarantee fees, will be used to repay the public debt that was issued” (EC
12/17/2008).
5. Participants in the Scheme had to be solvent and incorporated in Portugal.
Subsidiaries of foreign banks with a registered office in Portugal were included.
Beginning in August 2013, beneficiaries of the Scheme could have “‘no capital shortfall’
according to the most recent Union-wide capital exercise15 […] or other equivalent national
exercises by the national supervisory authority” (EC 8/1/2013).

As noted by the EC, “the 2011 European Banking Authority (‘EBA’) capital exercise required at least a
capitalisation of 9% as defined by EBA” (EC 8/1/2016).
15
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As a result of the solvency requirement, the Portuguese authorities did not provide the ailing
Banco Privado Português (BPP) a state guarantee within the framework of the Scheme (EC
2009). The authorities were instead required to rely on earlier authority, Portuguese Law
n.º112/97 (1997), in providing the state guarantee to BPP. The 1997 law established
authority for the Portuguese government, or related legal entities, to make guarantees.
Similarly, the EC was ultimately unable to extend under the Scheme the guarantee on bonds
that had been transferred to Novo Banco. Novo Banco was the bridge bank that was created
in August 2014 as a result of the resolution of Banco Espírito Santo, S.A. (BES). In this context,
the State guaranteed bonds issued by BES in 2011 and 2012 under the Scheme were
transferred to Novo Banco. While Novo Banco extended the maturity and guarantee of these
bonds under the Scheme in 2014, in November 2015 it was found to have a capital shortfall
under a stress test adverse scenario (EC 2015). When a further extension of the maturity and
guarantee of these bonds was sought in 2015, they were therefore extended (for one year,
with revised coupons) outside the framework of the Scheme (EC 2015.).
The Bank of Portugal and the Institute of Management of Treasury and Public Credit16 had
to confirm a credit institution’s eligibility to participate in the Scheme.
For the aid to be granted, banks had to submit documentation proving the aid was “essential
to ensure the applicant’s normal financing” (EC 12/17/2008). Applicants were also required
to submit a draft financing agreement or documentation on the proposed debt issuance
specifying the relevant terms and conditions (EC 12/17/2008).
The Portuguese Minister of Finance had to approve each bank’s application.
6. It appears that Portugal instructed a government-owned bank to make the first
issuance in order to demonstrate the Scheme’s efficacy.
The first guaranteed bond issuance under the Scheme was made on November 24, 2008, by
state-owned Caixa. According to Caixa’s head of funding, the bank “had long discussions
internally about whether Caixa should come to the [government-guaranteed debt] market
or not given that we are 100% government owned. But in the end, it was a political decision
and it was decided that we would be the best credit [institution] to open this market”
(GlobalCapital 2010). Portuguese authorities saw Caixa as being the institution best
positioned to take this step (GlobalCapital 2010).
7. The Scheme did not cover subordinated debt.
Subordinated debt could not be guaranteed under the Scheme (EC 12/17/2008).
The exclusion of subordinated debt was consistent with the guidance set forth in the EC’s
October 2008 communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in

16

“Instituto de Gestão da Tesouraria e do Crédito Público, I.P.”
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relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (2008
State Aid Communication) (EC 10/13/2008).
The Scheme did not cover interbank money market deposits; did not cover liabilities already
under another guarantee; and did not cover operations in non-transparent jurisdictions.
The exclusion of interbank money market deposits was consistent with the ECB’s October
2008 recommendation that “government guarantees on interbank deposits should not be
provided” (ECB 2008).
8. At the outset, the Scheme covered maturities of three months to three years (five
years in exceptional circumstances).
The Scheme covered debt with a minimum maturity of three months. The maximum maturity
of guaranteed debt was three years, or exceptionally five years. Coverage of debt with a fiveyear maturity had to be “duly justified by the Portuguese Central Bank” (EC 12/17/2008).
As amended in February 2010, the Scheme provided that debt with maturities between three
and five years would be guaranteed “only in exceptional circumstances,” and that such debt
would not exceed one third of the Scheme’s total volume (EC 2/22/2010).
On March 27, 2012, the Portuguese government issued a Decree Order, Portaria n.º
80/201217, that materially expanded the types of debt covered under the Scheme consistent
with guidelines from the European Commission. Per the 2012 decree, “[i]n case of
guarantees on the issuance of covered bonds (on mortgages and on the public sector), the
maturity can go up to seven years” (EC 2012). The Order provided that “[t]he part of the
guaranteed liabilities with a maturity longer than three years will not exceed one-third of
the total value of the liabilities covered by the State guarantee” (EC 2012).
Guarantees on debt with maturity of over three years were limited to “one-third of the total
outstanding amount of guarantees granted to each individual bank” (EC 2017).
In the 2011 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of
State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (2011
Communication), the EC specified that “[s]ince pressure on the funding of banks is
concentrated in the term funding markets, State guarantees should in general only cover
debt with a maturity of between one and five years (seven years in the case of covered
bonds)” (EC 2011).
9. The Scheme covered only euro-denominated debt.
Only euro-denominated debt could be guaranteed under the Scheme (EC 12/17/2008).
10. There does not appear to have been any cap on an institution’s participation.
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Program documents did not specify any limitation on the amount of an individual
institution’s participation in the Scheme.
11. Beneficiaries of the Scheme had to pay a fee based on maturity of the debt and risk
proxy of the bank.
These fees were based on the October 20, 2008, Recommendations of the Governing Council
of the European Central Bank on government guarantees for bank debt (ECB 2008). For debt
with maturity of three months to one year, the Portuguese authorities charged an annualized
fee of 50 basis points (bps). For debt with maturity of over one year, the fee was 50 bps plus
the relevant CDS spread. The calculation formula for the CDS spreads was as follows:
For institutions with representative CDS data, The lower of either a) the median value of fiveyear CDS spreads during the period from January 1, 2007, to August 31, 2008; or b) the
median value of five-year CDS spreads for a representative sample of credit institutions with
the same credit rating for the period from January 1, 2007, to August 31, 2008.
For institutions with no CDS data, or no representative CDS data, but with a credit rating of
“A” or higher, the fee was the median value of five-year CDS spreads, for a representative
sample of institutions with the same credit rating during the period from January 1, 2007, to
August 31, 2008.
For institutions with no CDS data, or no representative CDS data and a credit rating below
“A,” the fee was the median value of five-year CDS spreads, for a representative sample of
institutions with a credit rating of “A,” during the period from January 1, 2007, to August 31,
2008.
Per the initial terms of the Scheme, the Portuguese government was authorized to raise the
fees during the period of the guarantee. Authorities made this decision “to allow the State to
increase the price of the guarantee in the case of normalization of the markets, so as to limit
the use of the scheme to cases where they are necessary” (EC 12/17/2008).
In 2010, fees were increased consistent with guidelines from the European Commission “to
encourage banks to finance themselves without state support and to limit distortions of
competition.” These increases to the ECB pricing formula recommendation of October 2008
were reflected by 20 basis points for banks with a rating of A+ or A, 30 basis points for banks
rated A-, and 40 basis points for banks rated below A-. Banks without a rating would be
considered to have a BBB rating (EC 7/23/2010).
Minimum fees were calculated based on Article 4 of Executive Order number 1219-A/2008,
of October 23, 2008, as amended by Executive Order number 80/2012, of March 27, 2012
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(EC 2017). Fees under the Scheme, which covered guarantees under Law 60-A, were
significantly higher than fees for guarantees under other laws (Tribunal de Contas 2009).18
In 2011, the EC issued a Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1
January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the
financial crisis (2011 Communication). The 2011 Communication laid out a new formula for
calculating fees under the Scheme and under other guarantee schemes operated by member
states.
In December 2011, Portugal modified the fees under the Scheme in accordance with the 2011
Communication (EC 12/21/2011). For banks with CDS data, the new formula was based on
CDS spreads and the iTraxx Europe Senior Financials index.19 For banks without CDS data
but with a credit rating, a CDS spread would be taken from the median value of five-year CDS
spreads of the same sample period for the rating category of the beneficiary bank. This would
be done using a representative sample of large banks in the euro area and the supervisory
authority would assess if the CDS data of the beneficiary bank was representative.
For banks with no CDS data and no credit rating, a CDS spread would be taken from the
median value of five-year CDS spreads of the same sample period for the lowest rating
category, based on a representative sample of large banks in the euro area. The CDS spread
for that category would be adapted based on supervisory assessment.
Because CDS were not considered to provide an adequate measure of credit risk for shortterm debt, the fees for guarantees of debt with a maturity of less than one year would be a
minimum of the sum of:
a) a basic fee of 50 bp; and
b) a risk-based fee equal to 20 bp for banks with a rating of A+ or A, 30 bp for banks with a
rating of A-, or 40 bp for banks rated below A- or without a rating.
In 2012, Portugal exceptionally calculated the fee for three large Portuguese banks based on
the CDS of a sample of the lowest-rated banks in the EU, rather than using each of the three
banks’ CDS spreads. According to the Portuguese authorities, the banks’ CDS spreads were
inappropriate measures because⎯notwithstanding the application of a “new pricing
formula [that] isolates the intrinsic risk of individual banks from changes in CDS spreads of
sovereigns”⎯the CDS spreads had “widened along the spreads of the sovereign. As a result,

Unlike fees under the Scheme, fees for guarantees provided under Law 112/97 or Law 62-A/2008 were set
between 0.2% (minimum) and 2% (maximum) in accordance with an October 19, 1995, order by the
Portuguese Minister of Finance (Tribunal de Contas 2009).
19 Formula: Fee = 40bp x (1 + [1/2 x A/B] + [1/2 x C/D]) where A is the beneficiary's median five-year senior
CDS spread, B is the median iTraxx Europe Senior Financials five-year index, C is the median five-year senior
CDS spread of all Member States, and D is the median five-year senior CDS spread of the Member State
granting the guarantee. The medians would be calculated over the three years ending one month before the
date of issue of the guaranteed bond. For guarantees for covered bonds, the guarantee fee could take into
account only one half of the risk-based fee.
18

873

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 2 Iss. 3

the individual CDS spreads of those credit institutions do not reflect fairly the intrinsic risk
of the credit institutions in question and may lead to the remuneration of State guarantees
being excessively high” (EC 12/17/2012).
In 2017, in providing the EC with an estimate of guarantee fees, the Portuguese authorities
“applied the formula for banks without CDS prices, as according to the Bank of Portugal’s
opinion Portuguese bank’s [sic] CDS prices are still tainted by sovereign risk and therefore
not representative since the calculations are related to a period of three years” (EC 2017).
12. Beneficiaries’ aggregate balance-sheet growth was monitored and limited before
being replaced with a ban on advertising based on the Guarantee Scheme.
Until mid-December 2012, the aggregate balance-sheet growth of beneficiaries of the
Scheme was capped at whatever value was highest: “the annual rate of growth of Portuguese
nominal GDP in the preceding year,” “the average historical growth of the balance sheets in
the Portuguese banking sector during the period 1987-2007,” or “the average growth rate of
the balance sheet volume in the banking sector in the EU in the preceding six months” (EC
12/17/2008).
If this threshold was exceeded, Portugal would make whatever adjustments to the Scheme
were necessary to bring aggregate balance-sheet growth back under the threshold.
According to the EC, this feature of the Scheme “help[ed] to ensure that support [was] limited
to what [was] necessary for restoring the normal functioning of the markets” (EC
10/30/2008).
Beginning in 2013, Portugal committed “to impose a ban on advertising referring to State
support by the beneficiaries of the scheme and to prevent them from employing any
aggressive commercial strategies which would not take place without the support of the
Portuguese government” (12/17/2012).
The advertising ban and the ban on aggressive commercial strategies were in line with the
2008 State Aid Communication suggestion of “restrictions on commercial conduct, such as
advertising invoking the guaranteed status of the beneficiary bank, pricing or on business
expansion” (EC 10/13/2008).
The 2013 proscriptions were specifically based on section 4(59)(f) of the Communication
from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (2013 Banking
Communication), which states that for a guarantee scheme to be approved, “the recipients
of guarantees and liquidity support must refrain from advertising referring to State support
and from employing any aggressive commercial strategies which would not take place
without the support of the Member State” (EC 2013).
13. Beginning in 2010, beneficiaries of the Scheme were required to submit
restructuring plans under certain circumstances.
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As required by European Commission guidelines for guarantee programs remaining open
beyond June 30, 2010, any beneficiary of the Scheme whose “total outstanding guaranteed
liabilities […] exceed[ed] both a ratio of 5% of total liabilities and the total amount of €500
million” was “required to present a restructuring plan within two months of the granting of
the guarantees” (EC 7/30/2014). These guidelines sought to encourage healthy banks to
shift to non-guaranteed issuances while requiring remaining banks to take steps to address
their weaknesses.
14. Initially, if a bank defaulted and called on a guarantee, the bank would be required
to either pay back the Portuguese state or exchange the loan for preference shares.
If a bank defaulted and called on a guarantee, the bank would be required to either pay back
the Portuguese state or exchange the loan for preference shares. The EC described this
feature as one of “various safeguards aimed at minimising distortions of competition”
(10/30/2008). Starting in mid-December 2012, the State could no longer “convert its rights
as a creditor into preferential shares” (EC 12/17/2012).
15. The Scheme was initially authorized until December 31, 2009 but extended 17
times until February 2019.
For a list of extensions, see Appendix A.

III. Evaluation
The Portuguese government and Portuguese financial institutions generally consider the
Scheme to have been successful. In 2010, the Portuguese authorities reported to the EC that
the Scheme had “fulfilled, until now, the aims proposed while allowing debt issuance to be
unblocked and to improve the level of liquidity in the financial system and the risk of
inherent refinancing” (EC 2/22/2010).
The Scheme may have contributed to the 2009 increase in bidding by Portuguese domestic
investors in covered bond issues that were outside of the Scheme; Portuguese banks
publicized the Scheme to promote investor support for domestic issuers. According to
Eduarda Vicente, then head of funding at Caixa, “[t]he bigger domestic bid [in covered bond
transactions] is also the result of work that we have been doing with investors on the need
for them to sponsor domestic issuers—if they like the product and the price. This is
somewhat of an education initiative that started with the introduction of government
guaranteed debt” (GlobalCapital 2010).
Speaking in 2010, Caixa’s Vicente described the Scheme as having been necessary at the time
of its implementation: “one year ago all markets were closed—we needed the government
guaranteed schemes—and during 2009 every product, bit by bit, became accessible for
issuers to use” (GlobalCapital 2010). According to Vicente, “the Portuguese banks accessed
the government-guaranteed market because it was the only product available at the time”
(GlobalCapital 2010). Millennium credited the Scheme with having contributed to 2009
results that surpassed expectations (GlobalCapital 2010).
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In 2011, following announcement of an increase in the Scheme’s budget as part of the IMF
rescue package, analysts at Citi criticized the Scheme as supporting banks’ access to ECB
funding rather than a return to the wholesale markets. Because the support package would
not decrease the perceived riskiness of the Portuguese state, the Portuguese government’s
guarantee would not help banks obtain funding in wholesale markets; Portuguese banks
would instead increase their reliance on the ECB (FT 5/9/2011, citing Citi 2011).
In mid-2011, analysts at Morgan Stanley suggested that the Scheme and other European
guarantee schemes were not sufficient to respond to the difficulties then facing European
banks, and especially Southern European banks, in obtaining term funding. Analysts
recommended a supranational, pan-European guarantee scheme because “bank funding
guarantees on a national basis in Southern Europe may not provide the confidence that
investors would value,” and “such a guarantee in a period of stress at a national level could
potentially raise additional concerns on the budget when investors want to see measures
towards debt sustainability” (FT 8/15/2011, quoting Morgan Stanley 8/15/2011).
In evaluating the possibility of a supranational scheme, GlobalCapital reiterated that “[g]iven
the negative feedback loop between Europe’s banks and governments, a guarantee from the
Portuguese, Irish—arguably even the Spanish—sovereigns would do little to help banks in
these countries find demand or attractive pricing for a new issue. On top of that, adding to
the existing government guarantee programmes in these countries is likely to increase
investors’ wariness of the sovereigns” (GlobalCapital 8/16/2011).
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Summary of Program
EC authorization 10/29/2008: State Aid NN 60/2008 – Document from the European
Commission authorizing and summarizing the terms of the Guarantee Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/State%20Aid%20602008.pdf. (English)
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/228100_902552_46_2.pdf.
(Portuguese)
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
Communication from the Commission – The application of State aid rules to measures
taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis
(2008/C 270/02) – European Commission document outlining State Aid measures allowed in
response to the global financial crisis.
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ion_2012_01_01_0.pdf.
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Decision of the European Central Bank of 7 July 2011 on temporary measures relating to
the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Portuguese
Government (ECB/2011/10) – European Commission document approving the Portuguese
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State Aid SA.35743 (2012/N) – Extension of the Portuguese guarantee scheme for
credit institutions H1 2013.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/246713_1393983_88
_1.pdf.
State Aid SA.36869 (2013/N) – Prolongation of the Portuguese guarantee scheme
for credit institutions H2 2013.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/249056_1495475_16
2_2.pdf.
State aid SA.37698 (2013/N) – Ninth Extension of the Portuguese Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/250627_1508376_85
_2.pdf.
State aid SA.38900(2014/N) – Tenth Prolongation of the Portuguese Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/253099_1577666_10
9_2.pdf.
State aid SA.39991 (2014/N) – Eleventh Prolongation of the Portuguese Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/255560_1631072_12
1_2.pdf.
State aid SA. 42404 (2015/N) – Twelfth Prolongation of the Portuguese Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Twelfth%20Prolong
ation.pdf.
State aid SA. 43996 (2015/N) – Thirteenth Prolongation of the Portuguese
Guarantee Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/261983_1770965_10
1_2.pdf.
State aid SA.45761 (2016/N) – Fourteenth Prolongation of the Portuguese
Guarantee Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/264911_1913831_10
2_2.pdf.
State Aid SA.47168 (2016/N) – Fifteenth Extension of the Portuguese Guarantee
Scheme.
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fifteenth%20Extensi
on_0.pdf.
State Aid SA. 48550 (2017/N) – Sixteenth Extension of the Portuguese Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Sixteenth%20Extens
ion.pdf.
State Aid SA. 51042 (2018/N) – Seventeenth Extension of the Portuguese Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/274528_2009825_14
4_2.pdf.
Lei n.º 60-A/2008 – Portuguese law establishing the credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/0000200003.pdf.
Lei n.º 112/97 – Portuguese law establishing the legal regime for the state to grant
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Lei%20112_97,%20199709-16%20-%20DRE.pdf.
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality – Document
outlining Portugal’s objectives in implementing specific economic policies and the steps it will
take.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/recommendations_on_guara
ntees%20ecb.pdf.
Portaria n° 1219-A/2008 – Portuguese ordinance regulating the credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/1219A.pdf.
Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on government
guarantees for bank debt – ECB document outlining its framework for government
guarantees on bank debt.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/recommendations_on_guara
ntees ecb.pdf.
Press Releases/Announcements
Banco Comercial Português emite dívida a taxa fixa garantida pela República Portuguesa no
montante de 1,5 mil milhões de euros (1/12/2009) – Announcement from Millennium bcp
that its debt issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21814%20%20probably%20not%20under%20scheme.pdf.
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Banco Espírito Santo informa sobre a utilização de garantias do Estado (BES 10/24/2008)
– Announcement from BES that it is considering use of the Portuguese credit guarantee
scheme. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR20615.pdf.
Banco Espírito Santo may apply for Portuguese State Guarantee (BES 10/24/2008) –
Announcement from BES that it is considering use of the Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR20616.pdf.
Banco Espírito Santo informa sobre garantia do Estado Português (BES 11/27/2008) –
Announcement from BES that its debt issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21224.pdf.
Banco Espírito Santo informs about the Portuguese State guarantee (BES 11/27/2008) –
Announcement from BES that its debt issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21225.pdf.
Banco Espírito Santo informa sobre emissão de divida garantida pelo Estado Português
(BES 1/8/2009) – Announcement from BES that its debt issuance had been backed by a
government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21788.pdf.
Banif: Comunicado (10/27/2008) – Announcement from Banif that it is considering use of
the Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR20652.pdf.
BES announces a EUR 1.5 billion issue of Fixed Rate Note guaranteed by the Portuguese
Republic (BES 1/8/2009) – Announcement from BES that its debt issuance had been backed
by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21789.pdf.
BPI: Comunicado (10/24/2008) – Announcement from BPI that it is considering use of the
Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR20617_0.pdf.
BPI: Announcement (10/24/2008) – Announcement from BPI that it is considering use of the
Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR20628.pdf.
Caixa Geral de Depósitos: Informação Privilegiada (Caixa Geral 12/5/2008) –
Announcement from Caixa Geral that its debt issuance had been backed by a government
guarantee. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21376.pdf.
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Caixa Geral: Informação Privilegiada (10/24/ 2008) – Announcement from Caixa Geral that
it is considering use of the Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR20627.pdf.
Comunicado (Caixa Geral 11/2/2009) – Announcement from Caixa Geral regarding its
ratings downgrade.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR25786.pdf.
Concessão de Garantia Pessoal do Estado (BCP 12/13/2008) – Announcement from BCP
that its debt issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21494.pdf.
Decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB (in addition to decisions setting
interest rates) (ECB 7/20/2012) – ECB announcement regarding collateral eligibility.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Decisions%20taken%20by
%20the%20Governing%20Council%20of%20the%20ECB%20(in%20addition%20to%20
decisions%20setting%20interest%20rates).pdf.
Diário da República no. 231/2008, 1st Supplement, Series II of 2008-11-27 (11/27/2008) –
Series of announcements from the Ministry of Finance regarding interventions to the global
financial crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2S231A0000S01.pdf.
ECB announces change in eligibility of debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the
Portuguese government (ECB 7/7/2011) ) – ECB announcement amending the eligible
instruments covered by the Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ECB%20announces%20cha
nge%20in%20eligibility%20of%20debt%20instruments%20issued%20or%20guaranteed
%20by%20the%20Portuguese%20government.pdf.
ECB announces changes to the use as collateral of certain uncovered governmentguaranteed bank bonds (ECB 3/22/2013) – ECB announcement regarding collateral
eligibility.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ECB%20announces%20cha
nges%20to%20the%20use%20as%20collateral%20of%20certain%20uncovered%20gove
rnment-guaranteed%20bank%20bonds.pdf.
Emissão de dívida ao abrigo das garantias previstas na lei n.º 60-A/2008, de 20/10
(Santander 10/24/2008) – Announcement from Santander that it is considering use of the
Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR20619.pdf.
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Guarantees granted by the State (BCP 10/24/2008) – Announcement from BCP that it is
planning to use the Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR20626.pdf.
Guarantee granted by the State (BCP 12/13/2008) – Announcement from BCP that its debt
issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21495.pdf.
Informação Privilegiada (Caixa Geral 11/27/2008) – Announcement from Caixa Geral that
its debt issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21232.pdf.
Informação sobre emissão de dívida pelo Banif – Banco Internacional do Funchal, S.A.,
garantida pela República Portuguesa, no montante de 500 milhões de euros (Banif
4/28/2009) – Announcement from Banif that its debt issuance had been backed by a
government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR23490.pdf.
INFORMAÇÃO sobre Garantia do Estado PORTUGUÊS (Banif 12/23/2008) – Announcement
from Banif that its debt issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21645.pdf.
INFORMAÇÃO sobre Garantia do Estado PORTUGUÊS (Banif 4/17/2009) – Announcement
from Banif that its debt issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR23250.pdf.
Information about the Portuguese State Guarantee (Banif 4/17/2009) – Announcement
from Banif that its debt issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR23251.pdf.
Millennium bcp issues €1.5 billion Fixed Rate Note guaranteed by the Portuguese Republic
(1/12/2009) – Announcement from Millennium bcp that its debt issuance had been backed
by a government guarantee. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.
core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR21815_0.pdf. blob.
Request for a State Guarantee in connection with a debt issuance, pursuant to Portuguese
Law 60-A/2008, of 20 October (Millennium bcp 5/24/2011)– Announcement from
Millennium bcp that its debt issuance had been backed by a government guarantee.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/request-state-guarantee-connection-debt-issuancepursuant-portuguese-law-60-a2008-20
State aid: Commission approves Portuguese support scheme for financial institutions (EC
10/30/2008) – European Commission announcement of its approval of the Portuguese credit
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guarantee scheme. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/IP-081601_EN.pdf.
State aid SA.43976 (2015/N) – Amendment of the 2014 Resolution of Banco Espírito Santo,
S.A. (12/19/2015) – European Commission announcement approving amendments to the
Banco Espírito Santo resolution.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/261942_1785271_264_2%2
0(1).pdf.
Summit of the Euro Area Countries: Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan of
the Euro Area Countries (EU 10/12/2008) – European Commission document announcing
Eurozone coordination in response to financial crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/EC_Decision_2010_10_12_0.
pdf.
Utilização de garantias do Estado (BCP 10/24/2008) – Announcement from BCP that it is
planning to use the Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FR20613_0.pdf.
Media Stories
BES and Caixa Geral de Depósitos (Jornal de Notícias 11/27/2008) – Article announcing
approval of state guarantees on BES and Caixa Geral debt issuance.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Estado%20aprova%20conc
essa%CC%83o%20de%20garantia%20ao%20BES%20e%20a%CC%80%20Caixa%20Gera
l%20de%20Depo%CC%81sitos%20-%20JN.pdf.
ECB suspends rules on Portuguese collateral (Reuters 7/7/2011) – Reuters article
regarding the EBC’s rules on government-guaranteed debt as collateral.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ECB%20suspends%20rules
%20on%20Portuguese%20collateral%20_%20Reuters.pdf.
Extension to state guaranteed debt (FT 6/7/2010) – FT article announcing extension to
Eurozone guarantee schemes.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FT.com%20_%20Companie
s%20_%20Banks%20-%20Extension%20to%20state%20guaranteed%20debt.pdf.
Government approves grant of guarantee to BES and CGD (Publico 11/27/2008) – Article
announcing approval of state guarantees on BES and Caixa Geral debt issuance.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Governo%20aprova%20co
ncessa%CC%83o%20de%20garantia%20ao%20BES%20e%20a%CC%80%20CGD%20_%
20Ministe%CC%81rio%20das%20Financ%CC%A7as%20_%20PU%CC%81BLICO.pdf.
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Government authorizes BES to issue debt using State guarantee (Jornal de Negocios
11/27/2008) – Article announcing approval of state guarantees on BES and Caixa Geral debt
issuance.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Governo%20aprova%20co
ncessa%CC%83o%20de%20garantia%20ao%20BES%20e%20a%CC%80%20CGD%20_%
20Ministe%CC%81rio%20das%20Financ%CC%A7as%20_%20PU%CC%81BLICO.pdf.
Playing collateral games in the Portugal bailout (FT 5/9/2011) – FT article regarding use of
guarantee debt as collateral for ECB facilities.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Playing%20collateral%20g
ames%20in%20the%20Portugal%20bailout%20_%20FT%20Alphaville.pdf.
Portugal BCP plans 1.75 bln eur state-backed bond (Reuters 5/24/2011) – Reuters article
regarding BCP’s plans to issue government guaranteed debt.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Portugal%20BCP%20plans
%201.75%20bln%20eur%20state-backed%20bond%20_%20Reuters.pdf.
Portugal's BES, BPI banks say eye state guarantee (Reuters 10/24/2008) – Reuters article
regarding bank interest in Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Portugal's%20BES,%20BPI
%20banks%20say%20eye%20state%20guarantee%20_%20Reuters.pdf.
Portugal BES plans EUR1.25 bln state-backed bond (Reuters 5/17/2011) – Reuters article
regarding BES’s plans to issue government guaranteed debt.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Portugal%20BES%20plans
%20EUR1.25%20bln%20state-backed%20bond%20_%20Reuters.pdf.
Reports/Assessments
Garantias do Estado a OPERAÇÕES de Financiamento em 2010 – Report on the Portuguese
credit guarantee scheme as of 2010.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/rel032-2011-2s%20(1).pdf.
ISIN Code (International Securities Identification Number) – Codes Attributed to Notes
Guaranteed by the Republic of Portugal – Document listing the government guarantees on
bank debt.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CodigosISINQUADRO_NET1
8_Ago.pdf.
The Notes Guaranteed by the Republic of Portugal – Code ISIN (International Securities
Identification Number) – Document listing the government guarantees on bank debt.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/EMISSOES_ISIN_INTERNET_
04_08_2011.pdf.
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Parecer n.º 1/2015: Parecer sobre a Conta Geral do Estado de 2013. Diário da República,
2.ª série — N.º 11 — 16 de janeiro de 2015 1283 – Portuguese government report on fiscal
year 2013.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Parecer%201_2015,%2020
15-01-16%20-%20DRE_0.pdf.
RELATÓRIO sobre a CONCESSÃO de Garantias Pessoais pelo Estado para o REFORÇO da
Estabilidade Financeira e da DISPONIBILIZAÇÃO de Liquidez Nos Mercados Financeiros –
Report from the Ministry of Finance on the granting of government guarantees on bank debt.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Actualizacao_Relatorio_Gara
ntias_Estado_ao_abrigo_da_Lei_60_A2008_Outubro_2009_versao_11_11_09.pdf.
Tribunal de Contas. RELATÓRIO N.º 53/2009-2.ª Secção. ACÇÃO de Acompanhamento da
EXECUÇÃO em Portugal do Plano de RECUPERAÇÃO Financeira da UNIÃO Europeia (2009)
– Report on the state of the Portuguese financial recovery plan as of mid-2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/rel053-2009-2s.pdf.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Extensions of the Scheme

Ext. No.

State Aid No.

Date of Extension

Extended Until

1

51/2010

02/22/2010

06/30/2010

2

315/2010

07/23/2010

12/31/2010

3

SA.321584 or SA.32158

01/21/2011

06/30/2011

4

SA. 33178

06/30/2011

12/31/2011

5

SA. 34034

12/21/2011

06/30/2012

6

SA. 34958

06/27/2012

12/31/2012

7

SA.35743

12/17/2012

06/30/2013

8

SA.36869

08/01/2013

12/31/2013

9

SA.37698

12/19/2013

06/30/2014

10

SA.38900

07/30/2014

12/31/2014

11

SA.39991

02/04/2015

06/30/2015

12

SA.42404

07/22/2015

12/31/2015

13

SA.43996

01/13/2016

06/30/2016

14

SA.45761

07/29/2016

12/31/2016

15

SA.47168

02/17/2016

06/30/2017

16

SA.47168

11/07/2017

04/30/2018

17

SA.51042

08/09/2018

02/09/2019

Source: Compiled from European Commission State Aid Decisions
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